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In the recent times, we have loads and loads of infor-
mation available over the Internet. It has become very 
cumbersome to extract relevant information out of this 
huge amount of available information. So to avoid this 
problem, recommender systems came into play, which 
can predict outcomes according to user's interests. Al-
though recommender systems are very effective and 
useful for users, the most used type of recommender 
system, i.e. collaborative filtering recommender sys-
tem, suffers from shilling/profile injection attacks in 
which fake profiles are inserted into the database in 
order to bias its output. With this problem in mind,we 
propose an approach to detect attacks on recommender 
systems using Random Forest Classifier and find that, 
when tested at 10% attack, our approach outperformed 
earlier proposed approaches.
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1. Introduction
We are living in an era of information overload 
wherein information is being incessantly bom-
barded and people are breathlessly embracing 
the wide array of information available to them 
vis-à-vis varied sources. The backlash against 
the information overload is getting stronger than 
ever and is assuming gigantic proportions. Thus, 
one tool which has been developed to tackle 
such problems is recommender system [1].
Recommender systems [2], [5] can filter out 
the information required by the user from the 
vast amount of information available using 
certain characteristics and thus this concept is 
very helpful in overcoming the problem of in-
formation overload. Recommender systems can 
broadly be categorized as content-based [22], 
collaborative [4], [18], [23], [24] and Hybrid 
[3] recommender systems. In this paper, we 
will be focusing on collaborative recommender 
systems [2] because these are the ones which 
are widely used in today's era because of their 
abilities to give output to users according to 
their own needs. It recommends items based 
on similarity measures between users and items 
and recommends items to users that were liked 
by other users who have exhibited similar 
tastes. Thus it can easily handle even unusual 
requests by users which were not possible with 
content-based recommender systems. Although 
collaborative recommender systems are quite 
helpful in many ways, they are still prone to a 
shilling or profile injection attacks due to their 
natural openness. In these attacks, malicious 
users are inserted into existing dataset in order 
to influence the result of recommender systems. 
Mostly these attacks are generated by product 
sellers or developers who aim to promote their 
own product or demote their competitor's prod-
uct.
Based on different assumptions attack models 
[28] can be divided into different categories 
such as push [27] or nuke [27] attacks and stan-
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dard [4] or obfuscated [26] attacks. Although 
previous research is effective in detecting stan-
dard attacks, it is not as effective as it should be 
for obfuscated attacks.
Thus, how can we effectively identify and resist 
profile injection attacks [14], [29] has become 
an urgent problem that needs to be solved for 
the better development and extensive applica-
tion of collaborative recommender systems.
In this paper, we propose a technique to detect 
profile injection attacks using Random Forest 
Classifier and conduct experiments on the Mov-
ieLens dataset [25] ‒ 1M to verify the effective-
ness of the proposed approach by comparing it 
with different classifier techniques. The paper 
is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the 
related work, in Section 3 we discuss details 
about our proposed approach, Section 4 deals 
with the experiments performed and their anal-
ysis and finally in Section 5 we conclude the 
paper along with the possible future scope.
2. Related Work
Shilling or Profile Injection Attacks pose a seri-
ous threat to recommender systems and collab-
orative filtering recommender systems which 
are highly vulnerable to these attacks. The term 
"shill" means posing as a fake user so as to de-
coy others. There have been researches regard-
ing detection of these attacks and reducing their 
effects on recommender systems. Since most of 
the fake profiles appear similar to genuine pro-
files it is quite difficult to identify them. The 
main work carried out in this field falls into two 
categories: techniques to increase the robust-
ness of recommender systems and techniques 
for detecting biased profiles, a technique which 
we will be focusing on in our work. In this sec-
tion, we will be discussing some of the previous 
research work that has been carried out in the 
field of detecting shilling attacks.
Zhou et al. (2012) [7] proposed a hybrid un-
supervised detection approach based on signal 
processing theory and designed a high pass fil-
ter to filter out the signal of attack profiles. The 
main advantage of this model was that it could 
detect attacks even if the number of attack pro-
files was unknown. Zhang et al. (2012) [8] pro-
posed Meta-learning based approach to detect 
shilling attacks and also proposed an algorithm 
to create diverse base level training sets through 
a flexible combination of various attack types. 
They generated a Meta level classifier by com-
bining various base level classifiers. Zhang et 
al. (2014) [9] proposed a spectral clustering 
method to make recommender systems resis-
tant to shilling attacks in the cases when the 
attack profiles are highly correlated with each 
other. To estimate the highly correlated group 
they worked by first translating the matrix into 
a graph and then applying a spectral clustering 
algorithm to find the min-cut solution which 
will be used to estimate highly correlated 
group. Williams et al. (2008) [11] focused on 
Probabilistic Latent Semantic Analysis (PLSA) 
based technique that might be used to reduce 
the impact of segment attack and also examined 
their robustness against traditional attack mod-
els by using a model based on PLSA that aims 
to offer significant improvements in stability 
and robustness against all identified attack pro-
files. Zhou et al. (2014) [12] proposed and eval-
uated an algorithm for detecting average and 
random attacks first by using a rough detection 
model that will be used to divide the profiles 
into genuine and potential attack profiles. Then 
the attack profiles set will be analysed, based on 
which genuine profiles will be further removed 
from the target item set. Yang et al. (2015) [13] 
proposed an unsupervised method to detect 
shilling attacks first by filtering out genuine us-
ers, using suspected target items as far as pos-
sible so as to reduce time consumption. Then 
they developed a new similarity metric by com-
bining traditional similarity metric and linkage 
information between users to improve accuracy 
of similarity of users. Q. Zhou (2016) [15] pro-
posed a supervised approach to detect obfus-
cated attacks, especially Average over Popular 
(AoP) attack by using the theory of term fre-
quency-inverse document frequency (TFIDF) 
to extract the features of attack and then used 
SVM (Support Vector Machine) to generate a 
SVM based classifier. Finally, they used the 
generated classifier to detect AoP attack. Zhang 
et al. (2014(a)) [16] proposed an ensemble de-
tection model by introducing Back Propogation 
(BP) neural network and ensemble learning 
technique. They created Ensemble Detection 
Model (EDM) through the combination of 
various attack types, created base training sets 
which included samples of attack profiles and 
detection, but how a biased user can affect re-
sults of a recommender system can be explained 
with the help of an example which is presented 
below.
Consider, for example, a recommender system 
that identifies movies a user might like to watch, 
using a user-based collaborative algorithm. A 
user profile in this hypothetical system con-
sists of the user's ratings of various movies on 
a scale of 1‒5 with 1 being the lowest. Table 1 
shows Eden's profile (genuine user) along with 
that of four genuine users. An attacker, Eve, has 
inserted attack profiles into the system. Eve's 
attack profiles may be closely related to the 
profiles of one or more existing users or they 
may be based on average or expected ratings of 
items across all users.
Suppose the system is using a simplified us-
er-based collaborative filtering approach where 
the predicted ratings for Eden on target will 
be obtained by finding the closest neighbour 
to Eden based on Pearson similarity. Without 
the attack profile the most similar user to Eden 
would be User 2, but after the attack the most 
similar user to Eden will be Eve. So in this ex-
ample the attack will be successful and Eden 
will get a recommendation according to the at-
tack and not according to a genuine user. Thus 
we can clearly see that even a single attack pro-
file can affect the result of recommender sys-
tem to a great extent and that these attacks can 
be identified with the help of some detection 
attributes.
Here, if Eve was not added as an authentic user, 
then User 2 would have been similar to Eden, 
but after the addition of attacker Eve, Eve is go-
ing to be most similar to Eden.
Thus it shows that how addition of an attacker 
can affect the results.
Here, the Pearson similarity is calculated as 
shown in the expression below. Similarly, r 
(Eden, Eve) = 0.72.
had great diversities with each other. Then they 
created base training sets to train BP neural net-
works to generate diverse base classifiers and 
finally selected parts of base classifiers which 
had the highest precision on validation data-
set and integrated them using voting strategy. 
Zhang et al. (2014(b)) [17] proposed a method 
to detect profile injection attacks by combining 
Hilbert Huang Transform (HHT) and SVM and 
making them work incrementally. They worked 
by constructing rating series for each user pro-
file based on novelty and popularity of items. 
Then they used Empirical Mode Decomposi-
tion (EMD) to decompose each rating series 
and extract Hilbert spectrum based features for 
characterizing profile injection attacks. Finally, 
they used SVM to detect profile injection at-
tacks based on the proposed features. As dis-
cussed above in [8], Bhebe et al. (2015) [19] 
also proposed a combiner strategy that com-
bined multiple classifiers to detect shilling at-
tacks in which KNN, SVM and Bayesian net-
works acted as initial base classifiers and Naïve 
Bayes was used as meta-classifier. Chung et al. 
(2013) [21] proposed Beta Protection (βP) to 
alleviate recommender systems and make them 
resistant to shilling attacks. βP was based on 
βeta distribution to detect and remove fake user 
profiles.
Sutter et al. (2008) [34] proposed a generic 
method to utilize tags as a supplementary source 
to predict item recommendations. Verbert et al. 
(2011) [35] presented datasets that can capture 
learner interactions with tools and resources 
and can be used for learning analytics research. 
Manouselis et al. (2011) [36] discussed how 
Technology Enhanced Learning (TEL) can de-
sign, test and develop socio-economic innova-
tions so as to practice them in real life scenarios 
as well. Konstan et al. (2012) [37] presented a 
review about how recommender algorithms can 
be applied to real life scenarios so as to predict 
better recommendations.
Above, we discussed different research work 
that has been carried out in the field of attack 
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3. Proposed Detection Method
The proposed detection model is based on the 
idea that a user might be an attacker and might 
be wishing to alter the results of the recom-
mender system. The basic goal of our approach 
is the identification of such users. Figure 1 de-
scribes the framework of our proposed detec-
tion approach for detecting attacks. Our frame-
work consists of three stages.
In the first stage, certain attributes are com-
puted on ratings assigned by users in the data-
set. Next, training and testing sets are used to 
generate Classifier for the purpose of shilling 
attack detection. In the final stage of detection, 
the proposed Classifier is used to detect the re-
sults.
3.1. Phase 1: Attribute Extraction
Attribute extraction forms a key factor in de-
termining the performance of shilling attack 
detection. Some of the attributes which will be 
used are RDMA (Rating Deviation from Mean 
Agreement), WDA (Weighted Degree of Agree-
ment), Similarity (cosine and Pearson similar-
ity), LenVar (Length Variance), and along with 
that, we will be using TF-IDF (Term Frequen-
cy-Inverse Document Frequency) [15] as well 
as a few combinations of the said attributes. 
With the help of a matrix example (Table 4), we 
will explain how these attributes are calculated.
1. Rating Deviation from Mean Agreement 
(RDMA): RDMA [19] can identify attackers 
by analysing the profile's average deviation per 
item or user. It is defined as:
,
,0RDMA











where Tu is the number of items user x rated, rx,i 
is the rating given by the user x to item i, ri is 
the average rating of item i, Rx,i is the number 
of ratings provided for item i by all users and Nx 
is the number of users. For instance, the RDMA 
value for User A is computed as shown below:
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Here, for the example, we have taken Rx,i = 5.
2. Weighted Degree of Agreement (WDA): 












where Tu is the number of items user x rated, rx,i 
is the rating given by the user x to item i, ri is 
the average rating of item i, and Rx,i is the num-
ber of ratings provided for item i by all users.
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Here, for the example, we have taken Rx,i = 5
3. Length Variance (LengthVar): LengthVar 
[6] is used to capture how much the length of a 
given profile varies from the average length in 
the dataset. It is particularly effective in detect-
















where #scorej is the average length of a profile 
in the rating database and N is the total number 
of users in the system.
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Here, for the example, we have taken the aver-
age profile length of the user as 3.
4. The Degree of Similarity with Top Neigh-
bours (DegSim): DegSim [12] is used to cap-











where Zi, j is the Pearson correlation between 
users i and j, and x is the number of neighbours. 
Z1,2 = 0.122 (Pearson correlation as discussed 
in Section 2)
DegSim = 0.122
As we have calculated DegSim for User 1, 
therefore, number of neighbours = 1.
5. To use the theory of TF-IDF [15], to extract 
the features for an attack, we first converted the 
rating dataset to a 0, 1 format by converting rat-
Table 1.  An example of how an attack can affect the results.
Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Target Pearson Similarity [1]
Eden 5 3 4 1 ?
User 1 3 1 2 5 5 ‒0.45
User 2 4 3 3 3 2 0.41
User 3 3 3 1 5 4 ‒0.68
User 4 1 5 5 2 1 ‒0.02
Eve 5 3 4 3 5 0.72
Table 2.  Modification of Table 1 by taking an average of rows.
Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Target Average
Eden 5 3 4 1 ? 13/4
User 1 3 1 2 5 5 16/5
User 2 4 3 3 3 2 3
User 3 3 3 1 5 4 16/5
User 4 1 5 5 2 1 14/5
Eve 5 3 4 3 5 4
Table 3.  Modification of Table 3 by subtracting an average from each rating element.
Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Target
Eden 7/4 ‒1/4 ‒3/4 ‒9/4
User 1 ‒1/5 ‒11/5 ‒6/5 9/5 9/5
User 2 1 0 0 0 ‒1
User 3 ‒1/5 ‒1/5 ‒11/5 9/5 4/5
User 4 ‒9/5 11/5 11/5 ‒4/5 ‒9/5
Eve 1 ‒1 0 ‒1 1
Table 4.  Ratings assigned for a movie by a user.
User or Movie Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Movie 5
User A 5 4 3 2 1
User B 1 3 2 4 1
User C 1 2 2 3 5
User D 2 3 5 4 1
User E 1 4 5 2 3
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is the rating given by the user x to item i, ri is 
the average rating of item i, and Rx,i is the num-
ber of ratings provided for item i by all users.
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Here, for the example, we have taken Rx,i = 5
3. Length Variance (LengthVar): LengthVar 
[6] is used to capture how much the length of a 
given profile varies from the average length in 
the dataset. It is particularly effective in detect-
















where #scorej is the average length of a profile 
in the rating database and N is the total number 
of users in the system.
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Here, for the example, we have taken the aver-
age profile length of the user as 3.
4. The Degree of Similarity with Top Neigh-
bours (DegSim): DegSim [12] is used to cap-











where Zi, j is the Pearson correlation between 
users i and j, and x is the number of neighbours. 
Z1,2 = 0.122 (Pearson correlation as discussed 
in Section 2)
DegSim = 0.122
As we have calculated DegSim for User 1, 
therefore, number of neighbours = 1.
5. To use the theory of TF-IDF [15], to extract 
the features for an attack, we first converted the 
rating dataset to a 0, 1 format by converting rat-
Table 1.  An example of how an attack can affect the results.
Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Target Pearson Similarity [1]
Eden 5 3 4 1 ?
User 1 3 1 2 5 5 ‒0.45
User 2 4 3 3 3 2 0.41
User 3 3 3 1 5 4 ‒0.68
User 4 1 5 5 2 1 ‒0.02
Eve 5 3 4 3 5 0.72
Table 2.  Modification of Table 1 by taking an average of rows.
Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Target Average
Eden 5 3 4 1 ? 13/4
User 1 3 1 2 5 5 16/5
User 2 4 3 3 3 2 3
User 3 3 3 1 5 4 16/5
User 4 1 5 5 2 1 14/5
Eve 5 3 4 3 5 4
Table 3.  Modification of Table 3 by subtracting an average from each rating element.
Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Target
Eden 7/4 ‒1/4 ‒3/4 ‒9/4
User 1 ‒1/5 ‒11/5 ‒6/5 9/5 9/5
User 2 1 0 0 0 ‒1
User 3 ‒1/5 ‒1/5 ‒11/5 9/5 4/5
User 4 ‒9/5 11/5 11/5 ‒4/5 ‒9/5
Eve 1 ‒1 0 ‒1 1
Table 4.  Ratings assigned for a movie by a user.
User or Movie Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Movie 5
User A 5 4 3 2 1
User B 1 3 2 4 1
User C 1 2 2 3 5
User D 2 3 5 4 1
User E 1 4 5 2 3
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ings. Numbers here denote the value of the rat-
ings and ∅ denotes the user that does not rate 
the item. Here, Table 5 acts as a rating database 
and in Table 6, ratings are converted to 1 and ∅ 
is converted to 0. We used TF-IDF as described 
below:
TFIDF (u, m) = TF (u,m) × IDF (m)
TF (u, m) = 0 if rating = 0 else TF (u, m) = 
1/number of ratings rated by a user. IDF (m) = 
log (genuine users/nu), where nu is the number 
of users who have not given rating 0 to movie 
m and belong to genuine users. TF (u, m) is the 
term frequency for user u and movie m and 
IDF (m) is the inverse document frequency for 
movie m.
( ) 1TF User A, Movie 1 5=
( ) 5IDF Movie 1 log 4
 =  
 
( ) 1 5TF-IDF User A, Movie 1 log5 4
1 0.223145
0.044628




3.2.  Phase 2: Shilling Detection Algorithm
We propose an approach for the detection of 
shilling attacks by examining various classi-
fier models like SVM [20], [31], Random for-
est [32] and MLP (multilayer perceptron) [33], 
etc. and then select the classifier model which 
outperform other models on the basis of certain 
evaluation metrics like precision and recall. 
The proposed attack detection algorithm is de-
scribed below:
After various experiments, it was found out that 
Random Forest Classifier outperforms other 
classifiers while taking care of different attack 
types and various attributes. It performed much 
better than other classifiers except in a few 
cases. Random Forests are basically based on 
the concept of Decision Trees but here instead 
of just using a single Decision Tree, Random 
Forests take up many Decision Trees. For ex-
ample, for our approach we have taken a De-
cision Tree count of 100. Furthermore, as dis-
cussed above, Random Forest is based on the 
basic structural principle of Decision Trees, but 
it works by constructing a multitude of Deci-
sion Trees at training time and outputting the 
class that is the mean or mode of the individual 
trees. In this way, it forms an ensemble learning 
method. It can easily classify large amounts of 
data with accuracy.
3.3.  Phase 3: Detection
We used the generated classifier to detect re-
sults for shilling attack by using certain evalua-
tion metrics such as precision and recall.
4. Experiments and Evaluation
In this section, we present the overall perfor-
mance comparison of our approach with some 
other techniques and classifiers.
4.1. Dataset
In our experiments, we have used the publicly 
available MovieLens 1M dataset [25]. This 
dataset consists of 1,000,209 ratings by 6040 
MovieLens users of approximately 3900 mov-
ies, which contains all genuine users. All ratings 
were integer values between 1 and 5, 1 being 
the lowest (disliked) and 5 the highest (liked). 
For our experiments, we chose 100 random us-
ers from the dataset.
For non-genuine users, we designed a dataset 
containing only malicious users. We used dif-
ferent attack models to create different attack 
profiles. Thus we designed attack dataset (con-
taining attack ratings for different malicious us-
ers) for different attacks according to the said 
attacks. For AoP attack [15], [26], [30], the set 
of attacked items consists of movies which fall 
into the category of most 5% rated movies by 
users. For User Shifting attack [26], [30], we 
selected some of the ratings from each profile 
and lowered their ratings by one. For Noise In-
jection attack [26], [30], we were required to 
calculate standard normal distribution on the 
dataset and multiply that by ratings and that 
came out to be 0.4. To create the test set, at-
tack profiles were injected individually into 
the dataset. In this paper, we only detect push 
attacks but this approach will be applicable to 







































































Phase 1: Attribute 







Figure 1. Framework of the proposed approach.
Table 5.  Example of rating dataset.
User or Movie Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Movie 5
User A 5 4 3 2 1
User B 1 3 2 4 1
User C 1 2 Ø 3 5
User D 2 3 5 4 1
User E 1 4 5 2 3
Table 6.  Converting table 7 for TF-IDF calculation.
User or Movie Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Movie 5
User A 1 1 1 1 1
User B 1 1 1 1 1
User C 1 1 0 1 1
User D 1 1 1 1 1
User E 1 1 1 1 1
Algorithm 1.  The proposed attack detection.
Input: ratings
Output: result
 For i = 0 to length (ratings) do
      Calculate selected attributes i.e. RDMA, WDA, 
      Length Variance, etc.
 end for
 For all attributes ε selected attributes do
      Classifier ← train using one of the selected 
      attributes and repeat for all other attributes
   result ← ∅
   result ← result ∅ {classifier detection result}
 end for
Return result
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Figure 1. Framework of the proposed approach.
Table 5.  Example of rating dataset.
User or Movie Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Movie 5
User A 5 4 3 2 1
User B 1 3 2 4 1
User C 1 2 Ø 3 5
User D 2 3 5 4 1
User E 1 4 5 2 3
Table 6.  Converting table 7 for TF-IDF calculation.
User or Movie Movie 1 Movie 2 Movie 3 Movie 4 Movie 5
User A 1 1 1 1 1
User B 1 1 1 1 1
User C 1 1 0 1 1
User D 1 1 1 1 1
User E 1 1 1 1 1
Algorithm 1.  The proposed attack detection.
Input: ratings
Output: result
 For i = 0 to length (ratings) do
      Calculate selected attributes i.e. RDMA, WDA, 
      Length Variance, etc.
 end for
 For all attributes ε selected attributes do
      Classifier ← train using one of the selected 
      attributes and repeat for all other attributes
   result ← ∅
   result ← result ∅ {classifier detection result}
 end for
Return result
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4.2. Evaluation Metrics
In the context of attack detection, our goal was 
to provide insight into how accurately the algo-
rithm identifies attack profiles. For measuring 
detection performance, we used precision [17], 
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4.3. Experimental Results and Analysis
4.3.1. Comparison of Recall and Precision
We conducted several experiments and com-
pared the performance of the proposed algo-
rithm with different classifiers as well as with 
different existing techniques. Tables 7, 8, 9 and 
figures 2, 3, 4 give a comparative performance 
of different classifiers we used for detecting the 
best classifier amongst them all for our problem 
and Table 10 and Figure 2 give a comparison 
between different techniques available for AoP 
attack detection on the basis of precision and 
recall.
4.3.2. Complexity of the Proposed Method
The average space complexity of the proposed 
algorithm is 0 (5n).
5. Conclusion and Future Work
The issue of Shilling attacks is a major con-
cern in the field of recommender systems. To 
maintain its trustworthiness, we need to either 
design recommender systems in such a way 
that they are resistant to such attacks or design 
algorithms which can detect attacks easily and 
Table 7.  Precision comparison of different classifiers at 10% AoP Attack.
Attributes\Classifiers SVM Naïve Bayes KNN Random Forest MLP
1. RDMA 0.47 0.275 0.35 0.40 0.325
2. WDA 0.80 0.70 0.85 0.98 0.85
3. Similarity 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.97
4. Length Variance 0.96 0.99 0.90 0.97 0.99
5. TFIDF 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.99 0.98
6. RDMA + Similarity 0.14 0.6375 0.6625 0.65 0.6375
Table 8.  Precision comparison of different classifiers at 10% Noise Injection Attack.
Attributes\Classifiers SVM Naïve Bayes KNN Random Forest MLP
1. RDMA 0.40 0.475 0.425 0.525 0.525
2. WDA 0.70 0.70 0.375 0.99 0.99
3. Similarity 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.94
4. Length Variance 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
5. TFIDF 0.96 0.94 0.89 0.98 0.94


























Figure 3. Precision comparison of different classifiers at 10% Noise Injection Attack.
Table 9.  Precision comparison of different classifiers at 10% User Shifting Attack.
Attributes\Classifiers SVM Naïve Bayes KNN Random Forest MLP
1. RDMA 0.23 0.275 0.35 0.35 0.325
2. WDA 0.70 0.85 0.85 0.96 0.93
3. Similarity 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.97
4. Length Variance 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.98
5. TFIDF 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.98













Figure 4. Precision comparison of different classifiers at 10% User Shifting Attack.
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effectively. Our proposed approach is carried 
out for this purpose only i.e. designing of an 
algorithm for easy and effective detection of at-
tacks. For this purpose, our paper demonstrates 
an attack detection model based on Random 
Forest Classifier and we conducted several ex-
periments on 1M MovieLens dataset. In our 
future work, we intend to extend and improve 
attack detection by
1. Working on more types of attacks i.e. stan-
dard and obfuscated attacks.
2. Working on different features and attrib-
utes for attack detection.
3. Trying to improve results and reduce com-
putation time by using most influential us-
ers instead of the whole dataset.
Although our proposed approach is quite ef-
fective, it will be hard to see if it can perform 
successfully in real life scenarios as well or not.
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